In just a few months, both Iran and Russia have effectively abandoned Syria. Russia notably failing to support its supposed partner, Iran.
Meanwhile, Jordan, Bahrain, the UAE, and—more discreetly—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and even Qatar have sided with their Israeli business ally against the Palestinians, Hezbollah, and Iran.
Pakistan
has exchanged missile fire first with Iran—whom it now claims to support—and later with India: two BRICS aspirants and one founding member.
China
for its part, has continued purchasing Russia’s surplus oil and gas at rock-bottom, near-exploitative prices, all while steadily encroaching on Russia’s strategic space—both within the Federation and along its Eurasian periphery.
Putin’s wars
have resulted in a doubling of jihadist-controlled territory in Africa, the collapse of the Sub-Saharan migration barrier, a slowdown in European economic growth, Russia’s political and economic decline, the military-political discrediting of Moscow, and ultimately paved the way for America’s grand resurgence.
China, Turkey, and the emerging Arab-Israeli axis have all exploited the war to gain ground and influence—enabling Tel Aviv to pursue, more openly than ever, its plan of Greater Israel.
What has become evident is that only medium powers with a unifying strategic idea and subcontinental scale truly matter.
Alliances founded on goodwill—especially those centered around trade—are ill-suited to global power dynamics. Whether called BRICS or EU, they are insufficient.
The European Union
never truly a Union beyond its name, remains a fragile confederation.
Its cohesion has depended on communication infrastructure, geo-economic interdependence, and NATO—whose “brain death” was forestalled by Moscow, and which remains the only viable arena for rearmament.
There are now two competing doctrines in Europe: one advocates gradual strategic autonomy from Washington, seeking to leverage U.S. economic disengagement and Pacific focus to rebalance global affairs. The other remains essentially passive.
The one positive trend
is that European leaders are beginning to question the constraints of EU treaties and are looking to bypass horizontal democratic limitations— instead seeking hard-won convergences on vital interests.
Germany, France, Italy, and Spain are exploring outward-looking strategies and multidirectional diplomacy—an approach the current Italian government is pursuing vigorously, particularly with India, Japan, and various African and Eurasian regions.
India, too, is moving in this direction—independently of the BRICS framework.
India has clearly illustrated the meaning of “multi-alignment”: in its recent conflict with Pakistan, it deployed French, Russian, and Israeli weapons, while Islamabad relied on Chinese fighter jets, Turkish drones, and American political backing.
The binary narrative of a global clash between Good and Evil—however it is framed—is an illusion.
There are no clear-cut alliances, only entanglements. Everyone aligns with and against everyone else.
We are now witnessing complex, overlapping struggles over energy, technology, and demographics.
To mobilize the masses, regimes invoke fanatical ideologies—Talmudic, Quranic, Old Testament, subversive, or neo-Soviet. Yet beyond the rhetoric, there is more mutual contamination than affirmation of identity. The moral disgrace surrounding Gaza is textbook.
This is the world that is taking shape.
The role each player assumes—and the consequences for its population—will depend on its internal cohesion, the scale of its domestic base, and the reach of its external influence.
Barring unlikely wild cards—made possible by the dismal quality of governance in several capitals, notably Washington—we are heading toward an interconnected world in which so-called multipolarity becomes de facto multivassalage under the emerging dominant duo: Washington and Beijing.
We are exactly where I anticipated we would be after 9/11.
Europe’s margin for maneuver has narrowed due to Russia’s choices.
Unable to accept an equal partnership with Europe—given its status as an economic and entrepreneurial dwarf—and offering little appeal beyond a base of disillusioned fringe supporters, Moscow unilaterally chose to end cooperation with Europe.
This cooperation could have forged a genuine “Third Force” on the global stage.
Instead, Russia gambled on brute force, reinforced by its century-old mastery of systematic disinformation. It attempted to undermine Europe in the Sahel, Libya, and Ukraine.
In its delusions of grandeur
Moscow believed this would make it the third pillar in a global ruling triad.
To achieve this, it even betrayed allies such as France—who had supported it in Georgia and Ukraine and armed Donbass rebels while proposing a military alliance with Moscow.
But things have gone catastrophically wrong.
Putin will be remembered—by those with a long view—like Churchill: as the man who sank his nation’s global influence and fueled war atrocities in order to guarantee dominance by another pair of powers.
In Churchill’s case, the U.S. and the USSR; in Putin’s, the U.S. and China.
Now, Europe must rally around itself
strengthen internally as much as possible, overcome the constraints of EU treaties, and define a foreign policy capable of preventing encirclement by Washington and Beijing.
Unless, of course, that forced convergence collapses into conflict—a real possibility.
Because the Chinese are vastly more capable, powerful, and intelligent than the Russians, and they will not settle for Moscow’s perennial role: playing second fiddle to its nominal enemies while boasting like bullies.
So yes, uncertainty remains
The potential new global duopoly is not hierarchical.
China cannot be defeated militarily—but in the arena of intellect and strategy, the U.S. may not hold its own. They are no longer dealing with the Russians, but people who have always known how to use their brains well, without any inferiority complex — unlike the Muscovites — and without the constant need to fake strength just to maintain the respect of the masses.
