What is the current state of international disputes and agreements?
Let’s begin with a fundamental point that is often overlooked: the capitalist and internationalist model has been adopted globally—with the partial exception of North Korea—and the differences between international players stem primarily from local cultures, the depth of their respective territories, and their geographical orientations.
At present, there are no true alternative systems in play—only more or less advanced, intelligent, productive (or conversely, primitive, short-sighted, and parasitic) versions of the same model.
This might disappoint those who imagine Tolkien-style scenarios, often labeled “geopolitical”—a term that, much like ketchup, is applied to everything indiscriminately to add a semblance of flavor to what is not fully understood.
There is no real clash between political models, nor are there genuine opposing “geopolitical blocs.” Those who see the BRICS as a cohesive strategic monolith are mistaken—not only because it includes rival powers such as China and India, but because it represents one of many loose international alignments still groping for direction after the 2008 global crisis.
Since the 2008 financial collapse, China—after three decades of practical subordination to Washington—rose to the top of the global economy
This shift (even before Trump) forced the U.S. to confront a second major economic and technological rival, in addition to Germany and, by extension, the European Union.
All recent strategic documents produced by the White House reflect this dual concern. Russia, by contrast, is largely dismissed—except as an energy supplier to Germany.
To this must be added the redefined American energy strategy—initiated in 2001—and the growing link between resource control and emerging technologies, which is now reshaping the global geopolitical landscape. The major Israeli-Arab gas hub, for instance, underpins many of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s strategic moves.
The U.S. effort to maintain global dominance now takes different and alternating forms but consistently follows three core principles:
Undermining international regulatory regimes—even those it originally helped create, such as the WTO. Paradoxically, this has made countries like China, Russia, India, Indonesia, Latin America, and even the EU more “globalist” and conservative in defending the status quo than the U.S.—even under Biden.
Delegating regional and macro-regional management to a variety of actors, ensuring they remain in competition with one another while maintaining a link, however loose, to Washington.
Maintaining a constant global presence—especially in terms of military power and influence—while striving to divide or at least prevent the excessive unification of regions or countries that could challenge American supremacy. Europe is the primary target of this balancing act.
Trump has pursued this agenda openly. As for the results, time will tell. Some developments appear to validate his approach, others less so. For example, foreign direct investment in the U.S. has reportedly declined, while it has increased in Europe—possibly a setback in the long-standing monetary rivalry across the Atlantic. The U.S. had seemed to win that battle thanks to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its geopolitical fallout.
In Europe, there is hope for a renewed push to strengthen the euro’s international role. If accompanied by genuine internal market integration, the euro could once again position itself as a viable alternative to the U.S. dollar—an idea that Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then head of the IMF, sought to institutionalize before being ousted in a politically charged sex scandal.
Ironically, the Chinese yuan could also aspire to that role, though it still trails behind the euro. Notably, Beijing’s CCER (Center for Economic Research at Peking University) has expressed support for a Trump-era proposal to engineer a coordinated devaluation of the dollar. This would, in turn, lead to a revaluation of the yuan—a dual move that could simultaneously stimulate Chinese domestic consumption and support American reindustrialization, as Chinese economists have clearly stated.
A new Yalta-style agreement? It’s one possibility among many. China is exploring several strategic options simultaneously.
Behind this tripolar power game—among the U.S., the EU, and China—there are clear winners and losers
Turkey has made major strides in consolidating influence over its region. Israel has done the same. India has made uneven progress. Russia, meanwhile, has lost ground on nearly every front—Eurasia, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean—and now finds itself heavily dependent on both Washington and Beijing. It retains influence only in areas where it acts in opposition to Europe, such as Donbas, the Sahel, and Cyrenaica—confirming that Russia can only move where its actions align with U.S. interests.
Iran, for its part, is now paying the price for its misguided anti-Arab and anti-social-nationalist strategies in the region—strategies that were once funded and armed by Israel, which has since abandoned them after achieving its objectives.
The United Kingdom finds itself caught between failure and attempted reinvention
With Brexit, it effectively committed political and economic suicide.
It lost its role as Washington’s trusted partner in Europe, failed to reassert itself within the Commonwealth, cut off access to skilled European labor (replacing it mainly with Pakistani immigration), and forfeited all the privileges it once held within the EU.
Even in defense spending, it struggles more than continental Europe—especially compared to Germany, which plans to invest €1 trillion over the next decade. Deprived of ECB support, the UK now faces debt interest rates twice as high as those in the eurozone. It’s important to remember that London has the Pound, a globally significant currency, and the City, one of the world’s leading financial hubs. If the UK is paying such a high price for stepping outside the protection of the ECB, one can only imagine how disastrous the consequences would be for any European country lacking these assets — especially if it were to leave the Euro, as some political opportunists continue to advocate.
Such are the miracles of the Exit “economists,” who still claim we’d all be better off printing Monopoly money.
London is now seeking a structural return through “coalitions of the willing,” hoping to reintegrate while saving face. Since the next decisive step in building a real European Union will inevitably override treaties and institutional constraints, the UK may find a way back—without a full confession—if it acts soon.
The capitulation of von der Leyen: A strategic Interpretation of a Misunderstanding
In reality, there was never a genuine negotiation: Trump acted with urgency and decisiveness, wielding the necessary deterrent arguments. The Europeans, meanwhile, rely on the gradual effects of joint investment and a partial withdrawal by the United States. This stance inherently compels them to wait.
Ursula von der Leyen is likely unprepared for the role she is expected to play. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the entire European framework remains fragile, especially when confronted with a superpower.
The agreement with Washington involves relatively moderate U.S. tariffs, except — and not coincidentally — in steel and aluminum, where increases reach up to 50%. Regarding commitments to purchase weapons and energy from the United States, perhaps too much emphasis has been placed.
Producing armaments rather than purchasing them marks a fundamental distinction, both from the standpoint of strategic independence and industrial development. The European defense sector has already experienced a significant boost, with seven defense programs launched and four financing and cooperation mechanisms established. Twelve highly competitive military industries are developing key projects, including the Italian company Leonardo, which plays a leading role.
Purchasing, even partially, U.S. weaponry is a necessary condition to initiate a process of progressive autonomy. This also entails a form of dependency: it is evident that these weapons will not be used against the United States in the future, nor without its consent. However, this is obvious—no one contemplates war against the United States. Even those who claim to pursue autonomy—such as neo-imperial Russia—employ military equipment containing U.S. components, including chips manufactured in California. Nearly all Russian Su-35 fighters incorporate elements from a value chain connecting China to companies like Texas Instruments and Intel.
Moreover, China remains heavily dependent on U.S. intellectual property and software, despite the absence of exact figures.
A European policy aimed at independence must focus on reversing this dependency and strengthening the European military industry vis-à-vis the American one. To claim that European rearmament is an act of submission reveals ignorance, superficiality, ideological bias, or demagogy.
This rearmament is not intended to confront Russia. The day Moscow extricates itself from its current quagmire, it will have other priorities than provoking NATO expansion at its expense.
In a rapidly reconfiguring international system, each actor can only assert itself if it possesses three essential elements: a deep capital market, effective political centralization, and a credible military force
It is precisely these three pillars that the United States frequently seeks to undermine. Consequently, former Gladio members, ex-NATO generals, sovereign populists, and MAGA supporters sabotage any common European defense project and—whether by coincidence or not—objectively benefit Russia, country by country. They feel a sense of awe toward figures like Putin and Netanyahu, probably because they are constantly seeking a strong man — though they don’t truly fit that role, as their bullying of the weaker is nothing more than pure and simple impunity.
Europe, which remains discreet and lacks political centrality on the global stage, has nevertheless developed remarkable potential despite numerous obstacles, especially those inherited from the Yalta order. Few observers have grasped the true depth of its dynamics, relationships, and interests. Yet all foreign ministries worldwide already regard it as a leading actor.
This European potential rests on its human capital, expertise, and capacity for technological innovation
The “supergrid” electrical network project, based on UHVDC technology, could transmit solar energy from the Mediterranean to Scandinavia in a fraction of a second—a clear advantage over the United States. Superconductor technology, currently under development in Germany, could transform Europe into a genuine energy powerhouse.
Little attention was paid to a significant milestone: last June, the European Union reached a historic achievement on its path toward energy transition—solar power overtook both gas and coal in electricity generation across the Union. Photovoltaic energy thus emerged as the leading source of electricity in the 27 Member States, accounting for 22.1% of total production.
Combined with structured rearmament and a genuine internal market union, Europe could emerge as an indisputable geopolitical actor. This would enable other global players to aspire to true multipolarity through global “triangulation.”
China itself is divided on whether to support or hinder this process. Yet indirectly, it is already laying the groundwork for its realization. During the “Hundred Hours War,” Pakistan outmatched India thanks to its PL-15 missiles. New Delhi found itself isolated against a Beijing ally supported by Washington, unable even to call upon Moscow’s historic mediation. This led not only to its decision to supply ammunition to Ukraine through triangulation with Germany but also to closer strategic ties with Europe and Japan, aiming to better position itself in the unstable Indo-Pacific region.
Ultimately, what Russian propaganda artificially attributes to the BRICS and the so-called “Global South”—the end of monetary hegemony and the rise of a multipolar world—can only be achieved by Europe. Provided, of course, it has leadership capable of meeting the challenge.
Yes, the European model must evolve
Yes, demographic and social issues must be addressed.
Yes, Europe shares the same capitalist model as others, though it retains a social sensibility rarely found elsewhere.
Yes, it remains trapped by itself and by the intellectual and cultural drift stemming from the Frankfurt School.
But none of this can serve as an excuse to renounce our role in the world. Failing to actively—and resolutely—support the building of a European protagonism would condemn our peoples and future generations to irrelevance.
An armed Europe, reconciled with the notion of war—natural and eternal—which we have tried to exorcise with the hypocrisy of comfort, could bury woke ideology and inhibitive pacifism, restoring common sense and vitality. In other words, restoring our future.
