Israel Bombed Iran
In the end, individual opinions matter little. Still, it is worth clarifying whether one approaches this event emotionally, ideologically, with prejudice, or through concrete and forward-looking analysis.
I do not expect my sentiments to be shared, nor do I impose them. But I will not pretend to regret what happened.
Iran bears responsibility for many things for which it is rarely held accountable. Chief among them is the erosion of nationalist causes across the Arab world, replaced—pioneeringly—by a religious and internationalist agenda. It is especially culpable for the destruction of Iraq and the rise of Islamist movements in Palestine that ultimately turned against the Palestinian cause itself.
Salafism, a form of terrorist and fundamentalist internationalism, was in many ways a Sunni response to Tehran’s Shiite-driven expansionism.
The “Shiite cause” was the first to de-nationalize the Arab struggle and strongly resembles Tsarist and Stalinist pan-Slavism: turning so-called “brother nations” into cannon fodder for one’s own strategic interests.
That said, even within its imperial logic, Iran has occasionally played a role that is not entirely negative—in Syria and Lebanon, for example. But the same could be said of any major power, including the UK or Russia: even destructive actors sometimes play stabilizing roles, depending on context.
From 1979 until Iraq’s collapse, the relationship between Iran’s leadership and Israel was characterized by structural complicity. Iran’s regional goals often aligned with Israeli interests. Israel armed Iran against Saddam Hussein, and for years Iran was one of its main oil suppliers, using a triangulation via the Netherlands.
The mutual hostility in public statements was largely theatrical—necessary rhetoric for domestic audiences.
When Saddam was executed, I hoped Nemesis would arrive in the form of unintended revenge—carried out by the very enemy Baghdad had once fought and Tehran had supported. That is how I interpret yesterday’s strike: as Nemesis for Saddam, in the form of a bloody clash between his greatest adversaries.
I also chose not to speak when Qassem Soleimani was killed in Iraq. For me, it was and remains a settling of scores between imperial powers.
But beyond personal feelings lies the material reality
How should we interpret Israel’s recent actions—in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and now Iran?
As I have argued before, they are part of the emergence of a solid Israeli-Arab energy and economic bloc.
With normalized relations across much of the Arab world and its growing role as an energy exporter capable of shaping regional dynamics, Israel is capitalizing on global instability to expand its reach and gradually piece together the map of “Greater Israel.”
Previous power dynamics have shifted in both scale and structure. With support from most Arab governments, and by leveraging the rivalry between India and China and its own ambiguous diplomatic support for Russia in the conflict in Ukraine, Israel has tilted the balance of power with the U.S. and drifted further from the European Union.
Initial reactions from world capitals are revealing.
The United States was quick to clarify it had no involvement. Russia has warned of an escalation—an implicit call for Iranian restraint. China voiced similar concerns, while also criticizing the strike. India and Japan issued cautious statements about monitoring the situation and protecting their citizens.
The European Union, via Italy’s Foreign Ministry, condemned the attack as a “unilateral initiative” that threatens diplomacy and stabilization. The EU’s High Representative called for “de-escalation and a return to dialogue, noting that Israel’s actions undermine ongoing diplomatic efforts”.
Is a wider escalation likely?
Possibly—but unlikely to be catastrophic.
The polarization we see is more a product of political rhetoric and the apocalyptic fantasies of aging radicals who cannot bear to leave the world without imagining an epic ending—brief, of course, because they still expect to enjoy it.
What is more plausible is a shift in global alignments.
We could see further macro-regionalization around Israel, along with a weakening—or even severing—of its longstanding Western ties.
This war may also open the door to multi-alignment strategies and an expansion of European influence increasingly distinct from that of the United States, and more in sync with emerging non-Western powers.
At the same time, it suggests to hinder the Israeli expansionism.
Then there’s the symbolic rivalry—the ideological “derby,” if you will
Everyone is free to prefer either a full theocracy or a secular-theocratic hybrid, to dream along with one or the other.
Some even invoke Iran’s ethnic composition—61% Persian, but 88% Muslim—as.
Ethnicity certainly matters. But if taken to an extreme, it would become impossible to criticize, say, the United States for Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
That said, while ethnicity is a factor, it is difficult to reconcile an Indo-European identity with a theocratic, dogmatic regime like Tehran’s—built on an endless list of prohibitions and rigid moral codes.
The Iranian system, with its authoritarian rigidity, stands in stark opposition to our values.
I hope for its collapse—just as I hope for the collapse of the mafia-style regime in Russia.
Because such transformations are the precondition for reintegrating these countries into a broader, more open global framework—one capable of challenging, or at least moderating, today’s centers of overwhelming power.
So far the Iranian and Russian leaderships have only reinforced global hierarchies—because within their ideological frameworks, they had no alternative.
