Let me begin with the talk I gave for several web radio outlets a few months after October 7
in which I emphasized that Israel had recently turned itself into an Israeli–Arab energy hub. I argued that this transformation had to be taken into account, as well as Israel’s new alliances with various Arab governments—some of which even cooperate in its air-defense system.
The discovery of large natural gas reserves off Israel’s coast strengthened its relations with Egypt and prompted the creation of a solid partnership with Cyprus and Greece. Israel’s participation in the East Mediterranean Gas Forum also fits into this phase of renewed regional activism.
Beyond the internal repercussions, the discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields enabled Israel to drastically reduce its energy imports and, in 2020, become a net exporter of natural gas. Since then, much of the gas extracted from Israeli deposits has been exported to Egypt through the East Mediterranean Gas Pipeline, which links Ashkelon to the Egyptian city of Arish and was originally designed to supply Israel with Egyptian gas.
The signing of the Abraham Accords in August 2020
—which normalized relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco—also had a deep impact on the development of Israel’s energy sector. A wave of bilateral agreements and investments soon followed, especially among Israel, the UAE, and Morocco.
While natural gas remains central to these energy relations, significant investments have also been made in renewables and hydrogen. In March 2022, the state-owned Israel Electric Corporation signed a memorandum with the Emirati firm Energroup to develop green and blue hydrogen projects in Israel. A few months later, in September 2022, Israel and Morocco announced an agreement to expand bilateral research opportunities in energy, focusing on the hydrogen economy, solar power, and battery technologies. Cooperation in these areas is also central to several regional or intergovernmental platforms in which Israel has recently taken part, from the Negev Forum to I2U2—the forum created with the UAE, India, and the United States.
Over two decades, Israel thus evolved from a country dependent on hydrocarbon imports into a net exporter of natural gas—a shift strengthened even further after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.
At the time, I argued that this transformation had to be factored in when examining Israel’s long-term aims, which include reducing any future Palestinian state—however necessary its recognition may be for agreements with the Gulf monarchies—to the bare minimum and keeping it under tight supervision.
Soon afterward, the situation deteriorated: there were bombings in Lebanon, Iran, and Qatar.
Where do things stand today?
The landscape is complex, shaped not only by the interests of the Gulf monarchies but also by their rivalries, while Trump is engaged in a double game aimed at safeguarding U.S. hegemony: one game with Israel and another with China.
Trump’s peace plan was endorsed at the UN Security Council by governments that are certainly not pro-Israeli, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
This plan—presented in Sharm el-Sheikh before a crowd of international players, with Mahmoud Abbas added at European insistence—is dated just one month after the Israeli bombing of Doha.
That show of force likely backfired.
Indeed, Trump quickly moved to extend U.S. protection to Qatar and proposed deploying international peacekeeping forces to Gaza—measures aimed at bringing Israel back into line.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Pakistan for a nuclear umbrella—a message to Tel Aviv and others. Pakistan is closely tied to China, and Beijing has gained significant influence in the Middle East. The United States wants to contain this by shoring up the Arab monarchies and pushing forward with the spirit of the 2020 Abraham Accords—a Trump initiative. Washington needed to respond swiftly.
Perhaps the most striking development is the American promise to Hamas
to grant immunity if it abandons armed struggle in favor of the mafia-style activities it already conducts among Palestinians.
Israel has tacitly accepted this, allowing Hamas to carry out public executions of Palestinians in Gaza accused of “collaboration.” The hypocrisy is staggering.
It was a matter of clearing out rivals, much as occurred in Italy in 1944 through a Russo-American maneuver that sent pro-British partisans to their deaths at the Fosse Ardeatine.
Hamas has always been a mafia-like, gangster formation used to undermine Palestinian unity. In a Middle East as complex and ambiguous as today’s, it has cut deals with almost everyone—seeking funding and protection—from Israel itself to Qatar, Iran, and even the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Almost all its sponsors are now asking it to take control of Gaza after a cosmetic makeover: a simple infiltration or a name change would suffice. Who better than them to act as the local bosses? Among bandits, understanding comes naturally.
There is little doubt Hamas will accept: it has already deployed its militias against Assad, and in Egypt it assists the government against other jihadist groups.
Yet several issues remain unresolved
The first is Netanyahu, who is utterly incapable of managing a “pacification” process. This explains why Trump has repeatedly pushed for him to be granted a pardon—clearly in exchange for a change in leadership. This shows that the Doha adventure weakened him rather than strengthening him.
Next, there is the question of what “reservation” will formally be left to the Palestinians.
Rumors suggest Israel may be willing to concede Gaza but not the West Bank.
Finally, we must determine which international force will guarantee pacification.
Leading candidates currently include Turkey, the United States, and Indonesia, but if such a force is formed, it will almost certainly be more diverse, as no actor will want to be excluded.
What effects can we expect?
Roughly those we anticipated more than a year ago.
First, in regions of strategic geographic and energy importance to us, control will again lie not with Europe but with regional powers, plus the United States and China.
Second, because we maintain economic and energy ties with Arab governments, the jihadist minorities that oppose them will be even more inclined to carry out terrorist attacks in our cities.
Third, as I unfortunately predicted, the voice of the Palestinians in Europe—or rather, the voice of Europe’s anti-Palestinians, aligned with the “rainbow antifa”—will increasingly cloak itself in a fantasy of imagined Islamism.
We are moving toward the islamogauchisme trend launched in France by Mélenchon.
The powder keg is far from defused, and the explosions will reach us as well.